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Collaborative Practice: An Overview

By Daniel S. Margolin and Lauren E. Walchli

Introduction

While litigation is often necessary in domestic relations matters, it is not always so. While parties to traditional family law cases do strive for settlement, their actions are always taken with an eye cast toward trial. The emotional damage caused by the process of divorce or fighting over children is not, and really cannot be, addressed by the court system. The collaborative divorce process provides an alternative way for parties to resolve their domestic differences and address their emotional needs.

Lawyers also see several benefits from the collaborative process: (1) Higher collection rates. The issue of fees and payment is discussed openly and agreed on among all parties and lawyers at the inception of the case. (2) Better Calendaring. A fully collaborative practitioner's calendar would only have items scheduled about three weeks out at the most. (3) Happier clients. Never having to rely on a judge means that your client will have more control over the process, and he will likely be more satisfied with the result.

In the collaborative divorce process, both parties and their attorneys agree to adhere to specific protocols in a non-adversarial, non-positional, non-court process. While many attorneys consider themselves to be cooperative, collaborative law is a very specific process which requires training and a different set of tools than litigation. It has gained in popularity in large part because the process is aimed at helping parties reach beneficial resolutions of their disputes, can be less expensive than litigation, and reduces the need for modifications.

Uniform Collaborative Law Act

At its annual conference in July 2009, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Collaborative Law Act (UCLA). The UCLA sets forth the basic Collaborative Law procedure, a process that has gained widespread recognition and acceptance both nationally and in many other

Continued on the next page

countries. The full text of the UCLA should be available at <http://www.nccusl.org> in the near future. As of this writing, the UCLA has not been enacted in any state and it has not been submitted to the ABA for approval. For a discussion of the UCLA and its future submission for approval by the ABA House of Delegates in 2010, please visit the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals website article by Gretchen M. Walther, "Challenges at the ABA House of Delegates: Part Four of a Four Part Series," at the following URL: https://www.collaborativepractice.com/t.asp?T=IncludeArticle&A=lib/collabconnect/2009_11/UCLAArticle4.htm

Attorney Client Meeting and Initiation of Case

It is crucial to allow potential clients to opt in to the collaborative process via informed consent. The process should not be pushed on a potential client, as he needs to fully understand and be fully invested in the process in order for it to succeed. You may also open the door to a potential malpractice claim if a client was pressured to use the collaborative process and was then disappointed with the result

The client retainer agreement for a collaborative case specifies that the attorney is being retained for the limited purpose of collaborative divorce, and it explains that the attorney cannot represent the client if the process breaks down. The attorney should have a list of items that the client is specifically agreeing to in opting out of the court process and into collaborative divorce, and the retainer agreement should contain an express understanding that the client chose the process as an informed decision. Sections 14 and 15 of the UCLA address the client screening and informed consent process.

The collaborative agreement, or participation agreement, is a statement of understanding about how the process will be conducted, and it remains in effect so long as the parties act in good faith. The collaborative process continues as long as no one moves towards or threatens litigation.

The process cannot work unless both attorneys are formally trained in the collaborative process. When you are retained by a spouse and the other party does not yet have an attorney, you should encourage the other party, usually via an introductory letter, to engage the services of a collaboratively trained attorney. A huge benefit of the collaborative process for a lawyer is the ability to work with an opposing counsel with whom you have a good relationship, or who at least is a like-minded individual.

Meeting

The entire process is centered around a series of four-way meetings. These meetings are generally limited to the

attorneys and parties, but can include neutral experts depending on the complexity of the case. This forum allows both attorneys to work with the parties to avoid impasse, focus on interest-based, as opposed to positional, negotiation and provide feedback on various issues that arise. This is not to say that the whole process is necessarily pleasant, but rather that the parties are supported to work through hard issues as they arise.

In general the four-way meetings should be scheduled for two hours at a time, as any longer usually leads to tired parties and attorneys and to a lack of focus. The frequency and number of meetings is very case-specific. At the end of every four-way, the attorneys and parties plan the next meeting, including the agenda and any homework that needs to be completed.

All negotiation takes place in four-way meetings. During the lulls between meetings, the lawyers work with their clients to prepare for the next meeting, and do any homework that needs to be completed prior to the next meeting, such as gathering discovery.

Experts

In litigation, most experts are hidden by each side in anticipation of trial. In a collaborative case, all experts are hired jointly and their work product is freely shared.

There are a number of different neutral experts that may be used to augment the collaborative process, although a case can be completed without involving any experts. Types of experts include child specialists, financial mediators and analysts, divorce coaches and vocational experts. Each neutral expert should have the clients sign a participation agreement, including language regarding the confidentiality and non-dissemination of work product in litigation.

A divorce coach should have a background in mental health and be trained in the collaborative process. The coach will work with the clients to identify and prioritize the concerns of each person, while helping the parties make effective use of their conflict resolution and communication skills and develop effective co-parenting skills. The divorce coach also works with the attorneys to point out problems before they derail the process, and assists if the parties reach impasse.

The child specialist is the collaborative divorce equivalent of a custody evaluator in traditional litigation, but works extensively with the parents to craft appropriate custody and parenting time arrangements rather than making a report and formal recommendation. The child specialist gives the children a voice in the process, helps the parents transition their children through the divorce, and guides the development of an effective co-parenting plan.

The financial specialist works with the couple on the specifics of their financial plan. He gives practical financial guidance, including planning, support and budgeting, provides a long-term picture of how settlement will look for each spouse, assists with the financial discovery process, confirms that the parties have a detailed understanding of their financial picture, and educates the clients with regard to the different financial division options available to them.

Discovery and Pleadings

The parties voluntarily commit themselves to full and open disclosure via voluntary discovery, thus limiting the cost and difficulty of discovery inherent in litigation. See section 12 of the UCLA. While this does entail trust between the parties, as one cannot bring a motion to compel, it is unlikely to pose a problem once both spouses have committed to the collaborative process. If a party reveals a relevant fact to his attorney in confidence, and asks that it be kept confidential, the attorney is obligated pursuant to the participation agreement to withdraw from the case unless the client decides to reveal the mandatory discovery to the other party and attorney.

The goal of the collaborative process is a final and complete agreement that resolves all financial and parenting issues of the divorce. When all issues have been agreed upon, the lawyers go through the formal process of drafting the General Judgment and other required pleadings. See section 8 of the UCLA.

Impasse and Its Resolution

In the event of an impasse, the attorneys must withdraw from the case, and the parties must hire new attorneys to represent them in subsequent litigation. See section 5 of the UCLA. This aspect of collaborative law, while perhaps the most controversial, has been approved by the ABA in its Formal Opinion 07-447 (August 9, 2007). The ABA opinion can be found at the following URL: <http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200801/07-447.pdf>

The UCLA addresses this issue in part by providing in section 9(c) that the collaborative attorney may represent the client to “seek or defend an emergency order to protect the health, safety, welfare or interests of a party.” In addition, section 10 allows another lawyer in the collaborative lawyer’s firm to represent the party in subsequent litigation if certain conditions are met.

The participation agreement should provide that, in the event of subsequent litigation, the communications between the parties in the collaborative law process are privileged and not admissible as evidence in the litigation, subject to certain exceptions. The UCLA addresses this restriction in sections 16 through 20.

The solution to impasse is often the fact that the parties will have to resort to litigation and lose all of the benefits of the collaborative process if agreement is not reached. As a practical matter, attorney fees are often the driving force in settlement of traditional divorce cases, in which the parties know they will have to pay their attorneys a trial retainer and significant additional funds unless they are able to settle outside of court, and in that respect the pressure to avoid additional fees by settling within the collaborative case is often no greater than the pressure to settle in litigation.

There is simply no fallback option for the collaborative practitioner if an agreement can not be reached unless the parties can agree to submit a specific issue to an arbitrator or mediator. Coaches and other neutral experts can be the key to overcoming impasse. The team working together should, with their diverse backgrounds, be able to find a solution that meets the parties’ interests.

Conclusion

The collaborative process has taken hold in other states and countries to a greater extent than in Oregon. There are many collaborative family law practitioners throughout the country that no longer practice traditional family law. This process is not for everyone, but it is worth exploring for lawyer who wants to add a skill to her resume, help clients reach better resolutions to their problems, or is dissatisfied with traditional practice.

In a collaborative case the parties, rather than their attorneys or the court, are responsible for the outcome. Not only does the collaborative process empower people to determine how their divorce will take form, it also encourages them to achieve closure and improve their communication and co-parenting skills in a way that a traditional divorce does not.

For family law practitioners interested in learning more about the collaborative law process, feel free to contact the authors or visit the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals website at <https://www.collaborativepractice.com>. Interested attorneys should also read Pauline Tessler’s excellent book titled “Collaborative Law,” which is published by the ABA, and “Collaborative Law: Deepening the Dialogue,” by Nancy J. Cameron, published by The Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia (2004).

Daniel Margolin is a founding partner of Stephens Margolin PC, and a Portland, Oregon native. His practice focuses on all aspects of family law litigation and collaborative practice, including appellate litigation. He received his law degree from the nationally acclaimed New York University School of Law. After graduating Mr. Margolin

Continued on the next page

FAMILY LAW NEWSLETTER

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The purpose of this Newsletter is to provide information on current developments in the law. Attorneys using information in this publication for dealing with legal matters should also research original sources and other authorities. The opinions and recommendations expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Family Law Section or the Oregon State Bar.

Layout and technical assistance provided by the Information Design & Technology Center at the Oregon State Bar.

Publication Deadlines

The following deadlines apply if a member wants an announcement or letter included in the newsletter.

Deadline	Issue
January 15, 2009	February 2009
March 15, 2009	April 2009

worked at the Oregon Court of Appeals for the Honorable Rex Armstrong. He then worked as an associate attorney at a local law firm. In 2005, Mr. Margolin formed the Law Office of Daniel Margolin, which, like Stephens Margolin P.C., focused on family law representation. Mr. Margolin recently presented at a national teleconference CLE on collaborative law put on by the National Business Institute.

Lauren Walchli received her B.A. from University of Oregon in 2003, and her law degree from William & Mary Law School in 2006. She worked at St. Andrew Legal Clinic for two and a half years, and focused on domestic relations law. In May 2009, Ms. Walchli began a solo law practice.

Claim of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Oregon Civil Cases.

By Lawrence D. Gorin, Esq

(Fifth Amendment and Art I, § 12, of the Oregon Constitution)

Most family law practitioners have at one time or another confronted the issue of whether a client, being cross-examined as a witness in a domestic relations civil proceeding, can assert a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer questions that, if answered, would not be particularly helpful to the client's case. This article will hopefully provide some insight regarding the law applicable to this issue.

Although the privilege against self-incrimination as set forth in both the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as Art I, § 12, of the Oregon Constitution refers to compelled testimony in *criminal* cases, it is uniformly recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination extends and applies to any proceeding, "be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory." *Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York*, 378 US 52, 94, 84 S Ct 1594, 1611, 12 L Ed 2d 678 (1964); *State v. Matthews*, 46 Or App 757, 613 P2d 88 (1980).

The availability of the privilege against self-incrimination does not depend upon the type of proceeding in which it is invoked but rather on the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure it invites. *State v. Matthews*, 46 Or App at 759-760, quoting from *In re Gault*, 387 US 1, 49, 87 S Ct 1428, 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967); see also *State v. Langan*, 301 Or 1, 5, 718 P2d 719 (1986).

Further, the answers to the questions put to the witness

need not be such as would themselves support a criminal conviction; it is enough if the answers merely furnish “a link in a chain of circumstantial evidence necessary for conviction.” *Blau v. United States*, 340 US 161, 71 S Ct 223, 95 L Ed 170 (1950).

The applicable legal standard for sustaining the witness’s claim of privilege based on self-incrimination grounds is found in *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 US 479, 71 S Ct 814, 95 L Ed 1118 (1951).

“To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it was asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” *Hoffman*, 341 US at 486-87.

If the court is so satisfied, the claim of the privilege will be accepted without requiring further disclosure. *United States v. Reynolds*, 354 US 1, 73 S Ct 528, 97 L Ed 727 (1953). It is improper to ask a witness (or the witness’s attorney) WHY the witness is claiming the privilege. The explanation as to why the privilege is being claimed may be as equally incriminating as the answer to the primary question itself.

The liberal application and protection afforded to the claim of Fifth Amendment privilege as construed under *Hoffman* may best be illustrated by examining three related federal cases that arose in Oregon in 1954. It was at the height of what is often called “the McCarthy era” and “the big Red scare.” A subcommittee of HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee) came west to Portland, convening at the downtown Pioneer Courthouse, to hold hearings to investigate Communist activities in the Pacific Northwest states. Several of the witnesses called to testify (suspected of being Communists or Communist-sympathizers), refused to answer questions propounded by the committee members. The cases are: *Simpson v. United States*, 241 F2d 222 (9th Cir 1957), *Wollam v. United States*, 244 F2d 212 (9th Cir 1957), and *MacKenzie v. United States*, 244 F2d 712 (9th Cir 1957).

In each case, the witness refused, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer such outwardly innocent questions as “What is your present address?”, “Isn’t it a fact that you live at 9115 North Geneva, Portland, Oregon?”, “Who is your present employer?”, “Did you ever attend elementary school?”, and “Did you ever attend college?” The witnesses were then charged and convicted of contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions before a congressional investigating committee. However, all three convictions were subsequently reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Simpson v. United States*, 355 US 7, 78 S Ct 14, 2 L Ed 2d 22 (1957). In reversing the convictions and upholding the witnesses’ Fifth Amendment claims, the Court expressly relied upon

its prior decision in *Hoffman v. United States*.

Practice Tip: Procedurally, it is the *client* who claims and asserts the privilege to decline to answer, not the lawyer on the client’s behalf. The lawyer’s role is simply to advise the client as to what the client ought to do. Suggestion: Arm your client with a 3x5 card containing appropriate language to be asserted/recited in order to invoke the privilege. [First time: “On advice of counsel, I decline to answer the question and claim a privilege under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and under Article 1, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.” Thereafter: “I decline to answer for the reasons previously stated.”] Also note that there is no “blanket” claim of privilege against self-incrimination. The claim must be asserted as to each individual question propounded to the witness.

Lastly, an important point about inferences when a witness in a civil case declines to answer a question, claiming that the answer to the question may tend to incriminate. It needs to be understood (and perhaps explained to the trial judge), that under Oregon law (which in this respect differs from the law in most other jurisdictions), no inference may be drawn by the trier of fact (be it judge or jury) from a claim of privilege. Although the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the finder of fact in a civil action from drawing inferences from a party’s assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege, see *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 US 308, 96 S Ct 1551, 47 L Ed 2d 810 (1976), the rule in Oregon is different.

Under Oregon Evidence Code 513(1), ORS 40.290, no inference (adverse or otherwise) may be drawn from a witness’s claim of an evidentiary privilege, and this includes a claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment in criminal as well as civil proceedings. See *John Deere Co. v. Epstein*, 306 Or 662, 769 P2d 766 (1988). Consequently, when a witness in an Oregon civil proceeding refuses to answer a question on self-incrimination grounds, the trier of fact may not infer the answer based on the assertion of the privilege, nor can the trier of fact infer that the witness must have (or may have) committed a crime simply because the witness claims the privilege.

Lawrence Gorin has been in private practice in Portland, Oregon for over 25 years and has published a number of articles on the law. He is a frequent contributor to the Oregon State Bar family law listserv and is known there commonly as “the professor” for his erudite and knowledgeable responses to legal queries from his colleagues. You can learn more about his practice at his website at: <http://www.divorcesource.com/OR/pages/ldgorin.html> . You can email him at: LDGorin@pcez.com

Thanks for Another Good Year

By Robert C. McCann, Jr.

A couple of weeks ago, Judge Murphy, the Family Law Newsletter Editor, contacted me to ask whether I intended to submit an article to the Family Law Newsletter in light of my tenure as Section Chair ending. He stated that it has become somewhat of a tradition for the outgoing Section Chair to reflect upon the year that had occurred and to give a sort of a state of the section statement.

My first response was to think “what else.” Shortly thereafter, I realized that it was little to ask based upon all of the benefits I have received this year as Section Chair. I would like to thank Judge Murphy for his gentle reminder.

Before going any further, I think it is important that I report the vital business news regarding our section. In 2009, our section membership increased to 1,116 members. We are among the largest sections in membership of the Oregon State Bar.

The Salishan Annual Conference was a success. 387 bar members participated and our section continued to present what I believe is the finest annual meeting of any section of the Oregon State Bar. For the first year, materials of this section were handled primarily in electronic form. Of the people I have spoken to, that was a success which has decreased the cost of the meeting for the section and at the same time, decreased the cost of the meeting.

In light of the success at Salishan and the decreased cost of materials, Salishan was run at a profit again this year. It provided attendees the opportunity to gain 10.5 general credits and one ethics credit. There was an opportunity to gain two optional credits. One for child abuse reporting and one for elimination of bias credits.

In light of the increased membership and the success of Salishan, the financial position of the section remains strong.

In the 2009 legislative session, the section sponsored two bills, HB 2310 and HB 2311, both which became law. Both modified the Family Abuse Act statutes. HB 2310 extended the court’s authority to modify an existing order for “good cause shown” such as specific changes in parenting plans. HB 2311 made an exception to the restraint on Respondent by permitting the Respondent to use a third party to serve Petitioner. Another bill introduced, HB 3888 would have reversed the *Olesberg* decision. This bill, as amended, was supported by the Family Law and Estate Planning Sections. The amendments never came up for a hearing before the legislature adjourned.

I remembered in December 2008, I had viewed being Chair of the section for 2009 to be a very daunting task. Having now completed that term, I can honestly say that the assistance I received during the year was unexpected. I have enjoyed working with attorneys that I might not have otherwise had an opportunity to interact with. I have long held the opinion that the best lawyers I have known have been very good people. This year, has convinced me that our section is indeed blessed to have many good lawyers and a great many good people.

In trying to put my thoughts together over the past couple of weeks, I took the opportunity to review the last few articles written by the outgoing chairpersons. I was impressed with the progress that this section has made with regard to the Listserve, website and newsletter. Through the efforts of many, our section has made remarkable strides on many fronts.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank some of the people I have worked with during the year who have made my job both easier and more productive and very enjoyable. Many of these people volunteered countless hours to assist the section. Many have done so for years and will continue to do so in the future. I take my hat off to them both personally and professionally. The level of commitment which they have expressed through their actions is remarkable.

First, let me thank the Oregon State Bar. Their support staff is ever vigilant to insure that the business of the section is handled in a timely, professional, manner. Particularly, I would like to thank Camille Green. She has managed to turn my good intentions and aspirations into actual action. Camille, thank you.

Susan Grabe, serves as the bar liaison. Even during this exceptionally busy legislative year, she has always been available to me and to other members of our section to answer questions regarding policy and history associated with section business. The Oregon State Bar and our section are very lucky to have her. Susan, thank you.

David Gannett, has helped me this year in dealing with the legislature and its processes. David loves this type of work. I am glad there are people like David who enjoy it. I, at times, felt like a lost child trying to deal with the various legislative issues which came up. David was a consistent compass and guide throughout the legislative session and period of time leading up to it this year. I do not know how many hours David commits to section business each legislative session. I am sure it is in the hundreds. He receives no compensation for this other than the warmth of knowing that he has played some role in trying to protect the legal system and its proper functioning. The section is indeed lucky to have him and is greatly indebted to his volunteer service. David, please accept my personal thanks.

The members of the Family Law Executive Committee that I have worked with this year are exceptional people. Each of them deserves the gratitude of all section members. I would like to personally thank Laura Rufolo who committed many, many hours to overseeing the organization of the Salishan Conference. Laura, thank you. Job well done.

The incoming executive board is comprised of returning and new members. The officers, Richard Funk, Tony Wilson, Laura Rufolo and Judge Charles Zenache will provide excellent leadership in 2010 and in the years beyond. The road which they will travel and which I have had the opportunity to pursue was paved by prior officers and members. I think it is appropriate at this time to thank Gordon Dick who is the immediate past chair of this section. Gordon has dedicated many years of service to the section serving as an executive committee member. The work that he and other chairman in the past have done has provided the foundation by which the section's current health and importance can be attributed. Thank you, Gordon.

Carl Stecker leaves the executive committee this year. He has through the last year served as secretary of the executive committee. I am glad I do not have his shoes to fill. He has completed his responsibilities with regard to that position better than I can imagine anyone else could have. I am amazed at his ability to attend the same meetings I do and to retain the detail that he has with regard to the business of the section. Carl, you have my respect and my thanks.

Scott Lebenguth has over the last few years served as the monitor of the Listserve. He has done an exemplary job. Scott, please accept my personal thanks as I possess neither the endurance or technical ability to do that job.

If there is one service of the section which has been the greatest help to me in my practice, it has been the Listserve. Assistance provided by members in response to inquiries from others is a remarkable statement regarding the nature of our membership in and of itself. I must say that I have learned more from Larry Gorin in the last few years than I did from many of my professors in law school. "Professor" Gorin, thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank the membership of the section for the opportunity to serve as Section Chair for 2009. As I have stated above, we are comprised of many good people. It has been my honor to serve them.

Robert C. McCann, Jr. is a partner in the firm of Long, Delapoer, Healy, McCann and Noonan, PC, in Albany Oregon. He has been with that firm since 1985 and a member of the Oregon State Bar since 1981. His primary areas of practice are family law and general civil litigation. Mr. McCann has been President of the Family Law Section of the Bar during the 2008-2009 year.

In Appreciation to the Authors

2009

*Kathie G. Stocker, Esq Jonathan A. Levy, Esq
Ann Richards, Esq Kristen LaMont, Esq
Joanne Reisman, Esq Margaret Olney, Esq
Lawrence D. Gorin, Esq Karrie K. McIntyre, Esq
Daniel S. Margolin, Esq Robert McCann, Esq
Lauren E. Walchli, Esq Jean Fogarty, Esq
Josh Kadish, Esq*

These colleagues took time out from their busy schedules to write articles for the benefit of all our readers in 2009. We owe them our appreciation. Please consider contributing your expertise in an article in 2010.

The Editor.

Remember: New Child Support Guidelines Go Into Effect

January 4, 2010

Changes include:

- Contingent cash medical support
- "Reasonable in cost" defined as 4% of adjusted income
- New parenting time credit calculation
- Child care costs caps
- 10% deviation from the guidelines for consent orders
- Renumbered and reorganized administrative rules

Look for the new calculator and work sheets available on line in mid December.

Visit: <http://www.doj.state.or.us/dcs/index.shtml> to review the final version of the guidelines rules. You may also want to review additional draft administrative rules that will implement 2009 legislative changes at http://www.dcs.state.or.us/oregon_admin_rules/nprm/default.htm,

Please contact your local bar association if you would like the Child Support Program to present training on the new guidelines or call my office if you have questions.

*Jean Fogarty, Director, Child Support Program
503-986-6120*

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OSB Family Law Newsletter

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Avoiding Burnout

By Ann Richards, Esq
(February 2009)

Bankruptcy for Family Law Practitioners

By Joanne Reisman, Esq
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By Kristen LaMont, Esq
(April 2009)

Tech Tips for Lawyers - Useful Web Calculators

by Kristin LaMont
(August 2009)

Tech Tips for Lawyers - Effective Asset/Liability Spreadsheets in Excel

by Kristin LaMont
(October 2009)

Temporary Modifications of Child Support – The Oregon Child Support Programs Recession Response Project

By Margaret Olney, Esq
(October 2009)

Time Management in Court

By Hon. Daniel R. Murphy
(August 2009)

What to do When Your Client Gets Arrested

By Karrie K. McIntyre, Esq
(June 2009)

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CHILD SUPPORT COMPUTATION WORKSHEET (CSCW)			
Determine Parent A and Parent B. (See Instructions)			
Parent A	Parent B	Parent C	Combined
Mary Parent	James Parent		
# of Joint MINOR Children (JOINT) → 1 \$500 \$645.00			
# of Joint MINOR Children (SEPARATE) → 0			
Income			
1. Gross Monthly Income			
	\$1,278.00	\$5,269.00	
2. Spousal support received (if any (see worksheet 5-4))			
	\$0.00	\$0.00	
3. Spousal support and/or mandatory orders (daily pay)			
	\$0.00	\$0.00	
4. Modified Gross Monthly Income (to line 1 and 2 and subtract line 3 and 4) enter result here			
	\$2,178.00	\$5,189.00	
5. Social Security benefits or approved Veterans benefits received for joint children (gross to volume of parent the whose disability or retirement benefits are paid, regardless of which parent actually receives benefits)			
		\$1.00	
6a. Number of combined children for each parent:			
6b. Credit for assigned children (to income scale for each parent's income from line 4, using number of assigned children for each parent as appropriate)			
	\$0.00	\$0.00	
7. Adjusted Gross Monthly Income (add lines 4 and 5 and subtract line 6) for each parent; combine amounts for Parent A and Parent B and enter result in "Combined" column			
	\$2,178.00	\$5,189.00	\$7,367.00
8. Percentage share of income (each parent's income from line 7 divided by the combined income)			
	30%	70%	
Basic Child Support			
9a. Basic Child Support Obligations (reference scale for combined income from line 7 and number of joint children)			
			\$699.00
9b. Basic Child Support Obligations for Joint Minor Children (reference to line 9 divided by total number of joint children, then multiplied by number of joint children)			
			\$699.00
9c. Basic Child Support Obligations for Child(ren) Assigned to Parent (reference to line 9 divided by line 8)			
			\$9.00
JOINT MINOR CHILD ORDER			
10. Each parent's pro rata basic child support obligation (line 9 times line 8 for each parent)			
	\$216.00	\$683.00	
11. Each parent's pro rata basic child support obligation after parenting time credit (reference to line 10)			
	\$0.00	\$9.00	
12. Each parent's pro rata basic child support obligation after parenting time credit (reference to line 11)			
13. Each parent's pro rata basic child support obligation after parenting time credit (reference to line 12)			